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Abstract 
We examine whether adopting a numerical fiscal rule framework to guide fiscal 
policy helps reduce sovereign risk premia in a sample of advanced and developing 
countries for 1985-2012. We address the self-selection problem of policy adoption by 
applying propensity score matching methods. The results suggest that adopting fiscal 
rules reduces sovereign risk premia.  
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I. Introduction 
 
There is a large literature on the merits of different policy regimes as credibility 
enhancers. The focus of attention was initially on the best choice of exchange rate 
regime (see Edwards (2001) for a survey), but from the mid 1990s this shifted first to 
the benefits of adopting inflation targeting (IT) and, later, to adopting fiscal rules 
(FRs). One way to measure credibility changes is through developments in sovereign 
risk premia. For example, Thornton and Vasilakis (2016) and Fouejie and Roger 
(2013) demonstrate that IT adoption resulted in lower sovereign risk premia in IT-
adopting countries compared to countries with other monetary regimes. In this short 
paper, we show that this conclusion also holds for FRs adoption—i.e., sovereign risk 
premia are lower in countries that adopt FRs compared to those that do not.  
 
Numerical FRs have been a popular addition to fiscal frameworks since the early 
1990s.1 The increased use reflects concerns about a so-called fiscal ‘deficit bias’ that 
results from governments’ shortsightedness and the ‘common pool’ problem 
(Wyplosz, 2013). One way to mitigate the deficit bias is to adopt numerical fiscal 
rules that impose binding constraints on the conduct of fiscal policy, thereby 
safeguarding public debt sustainability and helping to build policy credibility (Kopits 
and Symansky, 1998). In addition, investors might perceive the adoption of a rule-
based fiscal framework as a signal of a broader commitment to sounder 
macroeconomic policies and institutional reforms. If the adoption of FRs has these 
effects then, ceteris paribus, the adoption of FRs might be expected to result in a 
reduction in the risk premia paid to compensate lenders for the possibility of 
government default. This is the issue that we address in this paper. Specifically, we 
	 3 
examine whether the adoption of FRs-based policy frameworks (compared to other 
fiscal frameworks) has reduced sovereign risk premia in the countries that adopted 
them. In practice, countries adopting FRs have typically opted for rules that are linked 
closely to debt sustainability, with the most common rules specifying some measure 
of budget balance, and an explicit limit on or target for public debt. We focus on the 
impact of these two rules on sovereign risk premia in a sample of 67 advanced and 
developing economies over the period 1985-2012, 39 of which adopted one or both 
such FRs. Our results suggest that adoption of FRs reduces sovereign risk premia by 
between 1.1-1.8 per cent of the international borrowing spread (depending on the type 
of rule adopted) in FRs adopting countries relative to that for countries with other 
fiscal regimes. 
  
Empirical evidence on the impact of FRs on sovereign risk premia is limited and 
mixed, and it relates almost exclusively to the experience of the U.S. states and some 
European Union (EU) countries. For the U.S., this evidence includes Eichengreen and 
Bayoumi (1994) and Bayoumi et al. (1995), who report that constitutional restraints to 
borrowing reduce the costs of borrowing by US states; Poterba and Rueben (1999), 
who find that rules on U.S. states’ expenditure, deficits, and debt reduce their 
borrowing costs except when a state also imposes limitations on the ability to raise 
taxes; Poterba and Rueben (2001), who find that a sudden increase in the fiscal deficit 
raises state financing costs, but that the rise is smaller if states have strict FRs; and 
Johnson and Kriz (2005), who find that numerical FRs reduce borrowing costs but 
that the effect operates indirectly by improving credit ratings. For European countries, 
the evidence includes Iara and Wolf (2014), who report that FRs only impact on 
borrowing costs of euro area countries at times of market stress; Heinemann, et al. 
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(2014), who find that the impact of FRs on euro area countries is less important once 
historical fiscal preferences are taken into account; and Feld et al. (2012), who find a 
robust negative effect of FRs on bond spreads for Swiss cantons. One issue with the 
approach taken in these studies is that they typically search for FRs effects by 
incorporating a fiscal rule adoption dummy in a cross-state or cross-country samples 
and examine the statistical significance and sign of the coefficient on the dummy. A 
problem with this approach is that it ignores the self-selection problem of policy 
adoption and as such can lead to biased estimates when a country’s policy choice is 
nonrandom. We address the self-selection problem by evaluating the treatment effect 
of FRs adoption on sovereign risk premia making use of propensity score-matching 
methods developed in the treatment effect literature.  
 
2. Methodology and data 
 
We test the impact of FRs adoption on sovereign risk premia by examining 
developments in the spread between the interest rate at which a country borrows and 
the “risk free” rate, which we define as the yield on long-term U.S. Treasury bonds 
We have two treatment groups—one group of 33 advanced and developing countries 
that had adopted a numerical rule on the fiscal balance by the end of 2012, and a 
second group of 27 advanced and developing countries that had adopted a rule on the 
stock of public debt (with overlap between the two groups as many countries adopted 
both rules). We draw on IMF (2009) and Schaechter et al. (2012) for a listing of 
countries that have adopted numerical FRs and the dates of adoption. The control 
group comprises 29 non-FRs adopting countries. The treatment and control groups are 
listed in Table 1. Data on long-term sovereign bond yields are from the IMF’s 
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International Financial Statistics database and from Bloomberg and refer in most 
cases to government bonds of 10-year maturity. Figure 1 illustrates average sovereign 
risk premia for countries that did and did not adopt an FRs framework during 1985-
2012. The impression is of somewhat higher risk premia in non-FRs countries, at least 
since the mid-1990s. 
 
We make use of four propensity score matching methods to address the self-selection 
problem that have been applied recently to evaluations of macroeconomic policy 
(e.g., Glick et al. 2006, Lin and Ye 2007, 2009, 2013). The first method is nearest-
neighbour matching with replacement, which matches each treated country to the n 
control countries that have the closest propensity scores. We use two nearest-
neighbour matching estimators: n = 1 and n = 3. The second method is radius 
matching, which performs the matching based on estimated propensity scores falling 
with a certain radius r. We use a wide radius (r=0.05), a medium radius (r=0.03), and 
a tight radius (r=0.01). The third method is the kernel matching method, which 
matches a treated group country to all control group countries weighted in proportion 
to the closeness between the treated group country and the control group country. The 
final method is the regression adjusted local linear matching method.  
 
3. Estimating the average treatment effects 
 
We first use the following probit model to estimate the propensity scores, which are 
the probabilities of adopting an FRs framework conditional on a group of control 
variables: 
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𝑃 𝑌!" = 1 𝑋!" = Φ 𝑋!"! 𝛽 + 𝜂!"               (1) 
   
where 𝑌!" is a dummy variable for the adoption of an FRs regime, 𝑋!" is a set of 
control variables, Φ is the cumulative function of the standard normal distribution, 
and 𝜂!" is the error term. We then utilize the estimated propensity scores to conduct 
matching to obtain the treatment effects of FRs adoption (compared to those of non-
FRs adoption). For the control variables, we draw on Altunbaş and Thornton’s (2015) 
analysis of the determinants of a country’s decision to adopt an FRs regime, which 
suggests that the probability of a country doing so is greater if it has a high level of 
public debt, if economic conditions are relatively stable, if it is relatively open to 
international trade and its exchange rate regime is relatively inflexible, if it is 
decentralized fiscally, if the monetary framework embraces inflation targeting, and if 
the country is a member of a currency union. Accordingly, we include in our baseline 
probit estimation: the ratio of public debt to GDP; the rate of inflation, the rate of real 
GDP growth, real GDP per capita; the relative flexibility of the exchange rate regime; 
openness to international trade (exports plus imports as a per cent of GDP); and three 
0-1 dummy variables to indicate whether a country is a federation, has adopted an 
inflation targeting regime, and is a member of a currency union.  We draw on Mauro 
et al. (2013) and the IMF’s World Economic Outlook (WEO) database for data on 
annual fiscal balances, and on Abbas et al. (2010) and the WEO database for data on 
public debt.  Our macroeconomic variables are from the World Bank’s World 
Development Indicators database. In addition, we have drawn on the Reinhart and 
Rogoff (2004) coarse grid exchange rate regime classification that ranges from 1 
(least flexible) to 5 (most flexible); on Hammond (2012) for information on inflation 
targeting adoption, and the CIA Factbook for information on whether countries have 
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federal or unitary fiscal systems. 
 
4. Results 
 
The probit results are reported in Table 2. The baseline results (column 1 for the 
balance rule and 3 for the debt rule) are broadly as expected: the probability of a 
country adopting a numerical rule on the fiscal balance or the stock of public debt is 
greater if the stock of public debt, GDP growth, and GDP per capita are relatively 
high, the economy is relatively open, if an inflation targeting regime is in place, if it is 
a member of a currency union, if it is a federation, if the exchange rate regime is 
relatively inflexible, and if inflation is relatively low. To ensure that the treatment 
group and the control group are reasonably comparable, we sort the observations by 
their estimated propensity scores and discard the control group countries whose 
estimated propensity scores are lower than the lowest score among the treated group 
countries. The matching results based on the new sample are presented in Table 3, 
which reports the estimated average treatment effect on the treated (ATTs) for 
sovereign risk premia for the fiscal balance rule and the public debt rule. The ATTs 
are negative, statistically significant, and quite large in magnitude. The risk premia 
narrows by an average of between 1.5-1.8 per cent for the fiscal balance rule (row 1), 
and between 1.1-1.2 per cent for a rule on the public debt (row 3).  
 
As a robustness check, we take account of the fact that many countries in our sample 
received debt reduction over the sample period either as a result of multilateral debt 
relief initiatives or as the outcome of bilateral negotiations with official and private 
creditors. For some countries the debt reduction was very large—for example, 
	 8 
accumulating in current US dollars to the equivalent of over 100% of 2012 GDP.3 
Debt reduction influences not only the recipient country’s debt stock but also its fiscal 
balance because of the associated reduction in interest payments and would likely bias 
our baseline results. Probit results including debt reduction are reported in columns 2 
and 4 of Table 2. The coefficient on debt reduction is statistically significant and 
negative, indicating that countries that experience debt relief were less likely to adopt 
a rule. The associated matching results in these cases are reported in rows 2 and 4 of 
Table 3: the estimated ATTs remain negative, statistically significant, and of a similar 
magnitude. As such, we conclude that the adoption of FRs has a significant impact in 
reducing sovereign risk premia after controlling for debt reduction. 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
In this paper, we evaluated the treatment effect of adopting numerical FRs on 
sovereign risk premia in a sample of advanced and developing economies. We used 
different propensity score matching methods to show that the adoption of FRs on the 
fiscal balance and/or the stock of public debt resulted in a statistically significant 
reduction in sovereign risk premia—on average between 1.1-1.8 per cent of the 
annual yield spread. The results suggest that FRs help build policy credibility, which 
reduces the risk premia paid to compensate lenders for the possibility of government 
default.  
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Footnotes 
 
1. For example, IMF (2009) estimates that by the end of 2009, 80 countries had 
adopted national and supranational numerical fiscal rules to guide fiscal policy. 
2. The number of countries included in the treatment and control groups is 
constrained by the limited availability of long runs of international bond yield data. 
3. For example, of the countries in our sample, Ethiopia, Guyana, Liberia, 
Madagascar, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Sierra Leone, São Tomé and Principe, and 
Zambia all received debt reduction to the equivalent of over 100% of 2010 GDP 
during 1985-2012. 
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Table 1 
Treatment and control groups for sovereign risk premia 
1. Fiscal balance rule treatment group (adoption year) 
Argentina (2000), Australia (1998), Austria (1999), Belgium (1992), Bulgaria (2007), 
Canada (1998), Denmark (1992), Estonia (1993), Finland (1995), France (1992), Germany 
(1985), Greece (1992), Hungary (2004), India (2004), Indonesia (1985), Ireland (1992), 
Israel (1992), Italy (1992), Latvia (2004), Malta (2004), Mexico (2006), Netherlands 
(1992), Norway (2001), Pakistan (2005), Peru (2000), Poland (2004), Portugal (1992), 
Romania (2007), Slovak Republic (2004), Slovenia (2001), Spain (1992), Sweden (1995), 
United Kingdom (1997). 
 
2. Public debt rule treatment group (adoption year) 
Armenia (2008), Australia (1998), Austria (1995), Belgium (1992), Denmark (1992), 
Estonia (2004), France (1992), Germany (1992), Greece (1992), Hungary (2005), India 
(2012), Indonesia (2004), Ireland (1992), Italy (1992), Lithuania (1997), Malta (2004), 
Namibia (2001), Netherlands (1992), Pakistan (2005), Poland (1999), Portugal (1992), 
Romania (2007), Slovak Republic (2004), Slovenia (2000), Spain (1992), Sweden (1995), 
United Kingdom (1992). 
 
3. Common control group (no fiscal rule) 
Botswana, Burundi, Chile, China, Colombia, Egypt, Ethiopia, Fiji, Ghana, Iceland, Japan, 
Jordan, Kazakhstan, Korea, Malaysia, Moldova, Morocco, Nepal, Papua New Guinea, 
Philippines, Russia, Seychelles, Singapore, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Thailand, Turkey, 
United States, Venezuela 
 
Notes: Germany and Indonesia had fiscal rules for public debt in place prior to the 
start of the sample period (1985).  
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Table 2 
Probit estimates of propensity scores for adopting numerical fiscal rules 
 
 1 2 3 4 
Lagged public debt    0.0035** 
  (0.0007) 
   0.0009* 
  (0.0005) 
   0.0014* 
  (0.0007) 
   0.0005 
  (0.0008) 
Inflation   -0.0285*** 
  (0.0059) 
  -0.0341*** 
  (0.0090) 
  -0.0363*** 
  (0.0055) 
  -0.0418*** 
  (0.0008) 
GDP growth    0.0017 
  (0.0064) 
   0.0003 
  (0.0077) 
   0.0018 
  (0.0061) 
   0.0129 
  (0.0076) 
GDP per capita    0.0941*** 
  (0.0197) 
   0.0860*** 
  (0.0235) 
   0.1267*** 
  (0.0213) 
   0.1138*** 
  (0.0252) 
Trade to GDP   -0.0005 
  (0.0007) 
  -0.0019** 
  (0.0009) 
  -0.0022** 
  (0.0008) 
  -0.0034** 
  (0.0010) 
Exchange rate regime   -0.2486*** 
  (0.0399) 
  -0.2616*** 
  (0.0492) 
  -0.4311*** 
  (0.0496) 
  -0.4717*** 
  (0.0569) 
Inflation targeter    0.9945*** 
  (0.0990) 
   1.0270*** 
  (0.1160) 
   0.8525*** 
  (0.1122) 
   0.9108*** 
  (0.1323) 
Currency union member    0.8465*** 
  (0.0630) 
   0.8469*** 
  (0.0728) 
   1.2038*** 
  (0.0659) 
   1.1869*** 
  (0.0801) 
Federation    0.5542*** 
  (0.0872) 
   0.4449*** 
  (0.0991) 
   0.6791*** 
  (0.1044) 
   0.7719*** 
  (0.1200) 
Public debt reduction    -0.0214*** 
  (0.0077) 
   -0.0170* 
  (0.0101) 
Psuedo R2    0.245    0.249     0.347    0.348 
Observations    3,399    2,558     3,417    2,515 
 
Notes. Constant terms are included but not reported. Robust standard errors in parenthesis. 
***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the levels of 1%, 5%, and 10%. 
 
 
  
